Using instrumental variables approach, this paper investigates whether an increase in stockbased compensation for CEOs is associated with a reduction in the dollar value of all other CEO compensation, as agency theory would suggest. I find that, on the contrary, larger stock-based compensation is on average accompanied by larger other components of CEO compensation. Similar results are obtained when focusing on option grants alone. The analysis of the compensation practices in corporations that have voluntarily started to include option grants into income statements shows little support for the hypothesis that accounting methods affect the use of options in CEO compensation. * Acknowledgements: I am especially grateful to my dissertation committee chair Siddhartha Chib for providing valuable guidance. I also appreciate the valuable comments of Ted Day, Shane Johnson, Todd Milbourn, and seminar participants in Texas Lone Star conference in Houston, 2005. 
I Introduction
From the basic agency theory point of view, the increased role of stock-based pay in executive compensation packages that took place in the 90s is a welcome change. However, accompanied by dramatic increases in the dollar size of the compensation packages, this change has raised concerns that, instead of serving the firm's and the shareholder's interests, the current compensation practices help CEOs take money out of the firm. Critics in particular point out that according to the current accounting standards, option grants are the only form of compensation that does not have to be reported on the income statement. 1 While there is a vast existing empirical literature that focuses on the use of stock-based compensation, an analysis of other components of CEO compensation is relatively scarce. This paper attempts to shed some light on the efficiency of both stock-based and other forms of pay by evaluating the tradeoff between the dollar value of stock-based pay and all other components of CEO compensation. I find that when a CEO receives new stock-based pay, the CEO also enjoys an increase in all other compensation. The result holds even after controlling for factors that may lead to an increase in the optimal CEO compensation, such as firm size and improvements in performance. This finding is indicative of CEOs using stock-based pay to take money out of the firm. Moreover, stock-based pay is not solely responsible for unjustified increases in CEO pay, and similar inefficiencies may be present in the use of the other components of CEO compensation.
Using Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003) governance index, I find that better governance (lower index) corresponds to lower compensation levels both in terms of stock-based and other forms of pay. There is only a fairly weak evidence that the tradeoff is more pronounced in firms with better governance. Interestingly, I find that firms with a lower index have less persistent option grant policies: smaller option grants are more likely to follow a large option grant when governance is better. This finding may be interpreted as a sign that firms with better governance are more actively involved in designing CEO compensation.
Empirical analysis of the tradeoff between stock-based and all other CEO compensation is complicated by the endogeneity of the option and restricted stock grant policies and the policies on all other parts of the compensation package. Both stock-based and all other CEO compensation are affected by a host of difficult to measure or unobserved factors. These factors may include expected future investment opportunities and firm performance, risk preferences of the agents, information 1 FASB has recently changed the standards, and most firms will have to comply to the new rules starting in 2006. asymmetry, and managerial ability, among others. I address the endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables approach. In particular, I use lagged stock-based compensation and four variables that are commonly used to measure agency relationship as instruments for option grants.
The agency related variables are Tobin's Q, CEO share ownership, leverage, and dollar volatility of stock returns. The choice of the instruments is motivated by the observation that agency-related variables determine the optimal incentive structure of CEO compensation, but do not directly influence the dollar size of the optimal compensation package adjusted for risk. In my analysis, I
rely on the sample of large publicly traded US corporations, on which the data is available from CRSP and ExecuComp.
The instrumental variable models estimated in this paper capture the unobserved factors that influence both stock-based and all other CEO compensation by allowing for a non-zero correlation between the error terms in the equations for option grants and all other CEO compensation. I find the correlation to be negative and significant. This estimate indicates that the unobserved factors that affect both options and all other CEO compensation in the opposite directions, such as risk aversion and CEO talent, have more impact on the CEO compensation than the unobserved factors that affect the two variables in the same direction, such as unobserved determinants of the total compensation size.
While the main results in the paper are based on panel data analysis, I investigate whether similar results are present in the cross-section by looking at the averages of stock-based and all other pay over the sample period. This approach also allows me to address concerns that current option grants are often a part of a long-term compensation plan, and therefore the charge for stockbased pay might not be contemporaneous with the stock-based pay itself. The results from the cross-sectional analysis, however, are very similar to those from the panel data analysis.
While stock-based pay mainly consists of option grants, it also often includes restricted stock pay. In an important contribution, Hull and Murphy (2001) provide a theoretical analysis of a firm's optimal choice between option grants and restricted stock grants. They find that option grants are preferred when it is optimal to leave cash pay unchanged and increase the total compensation, while restricted stock is better if the cash compensation is reduced and the total compensation (adjusted for risk) remains unchanged. This analysis implies that it may be optimal to leave all other pay unchanged if stock-based pay mainly takes the form of option grants. I find that focusing on option grants alone and removing restricted stock grants produces the same evaluation of the tradeoff.
The positive relationship between option grants and all other compensation is inconsistent with the efficient use of option grants.
Because option grants are the only form of compensation that do not have a negative effect on the reported accounting income of the firm, it may be argued that changing the accounting standards and recognizing option grants as an expense would discourage CEOs from using new option grants to take money out of the firm. To test this hypothesis, I analyze a small sample of firms that voluntarily chose to expense option grants against their income. The results show that expensing options has no significant effect on the CEO compensation in these firms. I find therefore that the data does not support the hypothesis that accounting affects option awards to CEOs.
The most closely related paper is Bertrand and Mullanaithan (2001) (BM), who consider the tradeoff between option grants and all other CEO compensation. Their approach, however, is quite different. They circumvent the endogeneity problems by concentrating on the analysis of how the quality of governance affects the charge for option grants. Additionally, they focus on the firms in oil industry. They find support for the hypothesis that better governed firms charge more for option grants. While the findings of BM provide cross-firm comparisons of the charge for option grants, the results presented in this paper offer an assessment of the level of the tradeoff between option grants and all other CEO compensation for a large sample of publicly traded US corporations.
There is a vast empirical literature that analyzes whether executive compensation practices are in line with theoretical recommendations; see a review by Murphy (1999) . While a number of authors find that CEO incentive compensation responds to agency problems and the size of compensation is related to the CEO's abilities (for example, Mehran (1995) , Core and Guay (1999) , Milbourn (2003) ) others argue against that (Jensen and Murphy (1990) , Yermack (1995) , Ofek and Yermack (2000) , Hall and Murphy (2003) to name a few). The findings in this paper are consistent with stock-based pay offered when there are more agency problems. The lack of tradeoff, however, indicates that the dollar size of both stock-based and all other pay may be too high.
The following section describes the data sample. Section III develops an instrumental variable panel model with censored treatment, and Section IV discusses the estimation technique. Section V presents the main estimation results as well as a number of robustness tests. Section VI discusses accounting for option grants, and section VII concludes.
II Data
The main source of data is ExecuComp, which provides information on executive compensation and firm characteristics for large US public companies for the years 1992-2002. Stock price information 
III Modelling Option and Cash Pay Tradeoff
The tradeoff between stock-based pay and other components of CEO compensation cannot be analyzed by simply regressing CEO cash compensation on the dollar value of option grants to CEOs.
Such approach would produce biased estimates because various parts of the CEO compensation are determined endogenously. Moreover, the direction of the bias is not obvious and depends on what unobserved factors have more influence on CEO compensation. On one hand, the unobserved factors that increase the total size of the CEO compensation are likely to produce a positive bias in the coefficient on stock-based pay because they induce an increase in both stock-based pay and all other compensation (this point is discussed in more detail in BM). On the other hand, unobserved CEO characteristics such as CEO ability and attitude towards risk, as well as the degree of shareholders' control over option grant policies may produce a negative bias in the coefficient on option grants. To illustrate the latter, consider CEO ability. Talented CEOs, expecting a good future performance, may wish to receive a larger proportion of their compensation in the form of option or restricted stock grants. Given a sufficiently strong relationship between ability and the composition of the optimal compensation package, one would expect a positive relationship between CEO ability and a dollar value of stock-based pay and a negative relationship between CEO ability and cash compensation. Thus, failure to account fully for CEO ability may result in a downward bias of the coefficient on stock-based pay.
I address the endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. First, note that the tradeoff between stock-based pay and cash compensation can be identified by having either stock-based pay or cash compensation on the left hand side and the other on the right hand side. higher volatility means higher risk premium required by the CEO for any given option award. The choice of instruments is further discussed in Section V.
It may be argued that the current accounting treatment of option grants results in an inefficiently large amount of options awarded to CEOs as a compensation for their services. According to the current standards, an option grant is the only form of compensation that is not required to be expensed against the firm's income and hence does not reflect negatively on the firm's reported earnings. Therefore, CEOs are less likely to face shareholders' disapproval if they use option grants to take money out of the firm. For more than a decade, the FASB attempted to change the accounting rules to require the same treatment for all forms of compensation, including option grants. 
where X it is a k vector of covariates (excluding the constant) on the ith firm in year t, whose effect on the outcome is not heterogenous across firms, and W it is a q vector of all other covariates (including the constant), whose effect on the outcome is modeled heterogeneously. Because different models estimated in this paper use different specifications of X and W , a more precise specification of these matrices is offered later.
To address the possible endogeneity problem, Options it are modelled using instrumental vari-
The Tobit model specification is chosen to model Options since the observed stock-based compensation is always nonnegative and 18% of the sample observations for this variable are equal to zero. Therefore, it is assumed that
This equation will be referred to as the treatment equation. Since omitted or unobserved variables may have an effect on both Options and Other, I allow for a non-zero correlation between the error terms in equations (1) and (2): ( 1it , 2it ) ∼ N (0, Σ). To introduce further notation, let matrix Σ be defined as follows,
To complete the model specification, I assume thatβ i andγ i are q dimensional random vectors, whose distributions depend on a set of firm-specific covariates A i . In particular, I assume that
where A i is a 2q × r matrix, and b i is a 2q × 1 random vector distributed as multivariate normal with a mean vector 0 and full covariance matrix D.
When all other compensation is specified as a treatment and option grants as a response, then the model can be rewritten as follows. The treatment equation is
and the response equation is
All distributional assumptions on the model parameters remain the same.
The analysis is mainly concerned with the following two parameters: coefficient β 0 , which measures the tradeoff between option grants and all other compensation, and covariance ω, which reflects the endogeneity factors that are not captured by the included control variables. Basic agency theory implies that an efficient compensation should exhibit a positive tradeoff between stock-based pay and all other CEO compensation. Since stock-based pay is risky and agents are risk-averse, the decrease in all other compensation corresponding to a $1 dollar increase in stock-based pay is expected to be smaller than $1. Therefore, if compensation exhibits the tradeoff, coefficient β 0 will lie between -1 and 0. Positive ( 
IV Model Fitting
The (Chib (1992) and Albert and Chib (1993) ) and instrumental variables models (Chib and Hamilton (2000) and Chib (2003) ). In the Bayesian approach, the parameters are treated as random variables, and given a prior distribution and the observed data, the focus is on the posterior distribution of the parameters, which by Bayes' theorem is proportional to the prior distribution times the likelihood function. 
V Results

V.A Tradeoff Between Option Grants and Other Compensation
I estimate the tradeoff between stock-based pay and all other compensation using model (1)- (2) with the following instruments and control variables:
Response: Other IV model (1)-(2). Control variables also include constant, ln(total assets), interest coverage, tax loss carry-forward dummy, zero dividends dummy, last year stock return, restricted stock grants, new and departing CEO dummies. 95% probability interval for the posterior is in parentheses.
Following BM, I include in Model 1 the product of governance index and lagged option grants to capture the effect of governance on the tradeoff. If better governance means more tradeoff, the coefficient corresponding to this variable in the response equation is expected to be positive. Table 2 is indeed positive, but insignificant, and the magnitude is small compared to the coefficient on Options. This contrasts the result of BM who find that better governance significantly improves the tradeoff. The difference in the results may be due to 1) high correlation 4 between G*(lagged Options) and Options (correlation is 0.42), 2) different statistical models, 3) different data sets, and 4) different measures of governance quality used in BM. Although I cannot check the importance of the third and fourth reasons, I can investigate the role of the correlation and the model specification by estimating a regression similar to that used in BM on my data set. Hence, I next estimate the following regression:
The estimate reported in
where controls are constant, ln(total assets), return on assets, last year stock return, new and departing CEO dummies and year dummies. The results are reported in Table 3 . Consistent with BM, the coefficient on the product of governance index and lagged Options is positive and significant. I obtain almost identical results if I use current option grants instead of lagged. Further indicator of excessive use of stock-based pay is the positive coefficient on the governance index G in the treatment equation. It implies that firms with weaker shareholder rights (larger G) offer more option and restricted stock grants. Additionally, the negative and significant coefficient coefficient on the product G×(lagged Options) in the treatment equation implies that the size of option and restricted stock grants is more persistent in firms with weaker governance. It is difficult to argue on the theoretical basis that offering similar-size option grants year after year is inefficient.
Nevertheless, the finding is suggestive of firms with better governance participating more actively in designing CEO compensation.
As discussed earlier, the tradeoff between stock-based pay and all other compensation may be estimated not only using instruments for stock-based pay, but also using instruments for all other compensation. The model is given by equations (3) and (4) The results of estimating Model 2 are reported in Table 4 . Qualitatively, the results resemble those presented in Table 2 . The coefficient on all other compensation is positive and significant and the correlation between the two error terms is negative, but insignificant. The size of the coefficient implies that, on average, an exogenous $100 increase in all other compensation corresponds to an approximately $74.85 increase in the stock-based pay. IV model (1)- (2) . Control variables also include constant, ln(total assets), interest coverage, tax loss carry-forward dummy, zero dividends dummy, last year stock return, restricted stock grants, new and departing CEO dummies.
Looking for tradeoff between annual option grants and annual cash compensation may be misleading because many firms have option grant programs that stretch over several years. Tradeoff may be absent on a yearly basis if appropriate reduction in the cash part of compensation is made, say, at the the start of the option grant program. To address this concern, I estimate Model 1 using the data averaged over the years. If in any of the observed years cash compensation has been reduced to compensate for an increase in option grants, the averaged data should be able to capture the tradeoff. Using averages means that the data set becomes cross-sectional instead of panel. This, however, has little affect on the estimation procedure. Table 5 Table 2 . The correlation between the two error terms is negative, although it is insignificant for the cross-sectional data, while it is significant when panel data is used. IV model (1)- (2) applied to the cross-section of the firms. Control variables also include a constant, industry dummies, and averages of the following variables: ln(total assets), interest coverage, zero dividends dummy. 95% probability interval for the posterior is in parentheses.
An alternative way to address the possible bias introduced by the focus on annual grants is to look at the changes in the determinants of the optimal incentive pay instead of the levels of these determinants. Core and Guay (1999) argue that firms use option grants to restore incentives of the CEO when these incentives deviate from the optimal. This suggests that option grants may be related to the changes in share ownership, leverage, Tobin's Q, and volatility, rather than their levels. I next test this hypothesis by estimating the following model: The results of estimating Model 3 are reported in Table 6 . The coefficient on Options is still positive and significant, although the size is smaller than the one obtained from Model 1.
While three of the instruments (lagged Options, ∆(CEO share ownership), and ∆(leverage)) are significant, the positive sign of the coefficient on ∆(CEO share ownership) contradicts the basic agency theory implication that an increase in share ownership reduces the need for additional incentive pay. As in Model 1, the covariance between the two error terms in this model is estimated to be negative and significant.
Stock-based pay variable used in this paper consists two parts: option grants and restricted stock grants. Option grants, however, typically face more criticism than restricted stock grants because it is easier to neglect accounting for options as an expense. Whether this bias against option grants is justified can be analyzed by evaluating the tradeoff between cash compensation and the option grants part 5 of stock-based pay. Column (1) in Table 7 reports the results of estimating Model 1 using just option grants instead of the sum of option and restricted stock grants, and instead including restricted stock grants in the list of covariates. As in the original version of Model 1, the estimate of the coefficient on Options is positive and significant, and its size is similar to that 5 In spite of the recent increase in the use of restricted stocks, only a few companies in the sample incorporate restricted stock grants into the CEO compensation: 79% of observations on restricted stock grants are zero. This large percentage of zero observations on restricted stock grants makes this variable largely uninformative as either a treatment or response Control variables also include a constant, CEO share ownership, ln(total assets), interest coverage, zero dividends dummy, last year stock returns, last year ROA, industry and year dummies. 95% probability interval for the posterior is in parentheses.
reported in Table 2 . This result is not consistent with option grants being used more inefficiently than restricted stock grants. As in Model 1, the correlation between the two error terms is negative and significant.
Black-Scholes valuation method used so far in this paper to value option grants assumes zero transaction costs. Arguably, this assumption is not valid in the context of option grants to undiversified executives who often face restrictions on trading in the firm's stock. Thus, Black-Scholes method may overstate the true value of option grants to the executives. Because Black-Scholes method is a fairly good proxy for the cost of option grants to the firm, one would expect fewer option grants when there is a larger discrepancy between the Black-Scholes valuation (cost to the firm) and the executive valuation of option grants. This implies that using Black-Scholes valuation may induce a spurious finding of tradeoff between option grants and all other compensation.
Thus, using a more precise valuation method would only strengthen the conclusion reached in the previous section. To verify that, I next estimate Model 1 using an alternative valuation method developed by Hall and Murphy (2002) , which takes into account the additional risk premium required by executives who have a limited ability to diversify away idiosyncratic risks. As in the previous robustness test, I focus on option grants only and include restricted stock grants in the list of covariates. As expected, the results reported in Column (2) of Table 7 , are similar to those obtained using Black-Scholes valuation method, with the coefficient on Options larger than that reported in Table 2 .
The informativeness of the results presented so far crucially depends on the validity of the instruments. As mentioned in Section 2, valid instruments have to be, first, significantly related to the treatment variable and, second, insignificantly related to the error term in the response equation.
As Table 2 shows, three out of five instruments used in Model 1 satisfy the first requirement. The second requirement on instruments is more difficult to verify. Since there is no direct test, I analyze the results of Model 1 for robustness to removing some of the instruments.
The CEOs that own the firm's shares receive firm-related income not only in the form of compensation but also in the form of stock returns. The income obtained from stock returns therefore contributes to compensating the CEO for the appropriate level of effort. Moreover, CEOs with higher share ownership benefit less from any given increase in the compensation, since increases in compensation negatively affect the value of the firm's shares. Therefore, CEO share ownership may be negatively related to the reported total CEO compensation and thus may violate the second requirement that instruments must satisfy. To address this critique, I modify Model 1 by excluding CEO stock ownership from the list of instruments and instead using them as controls in both response and treatment equations. The results are reported in Column (3) of Table 7 . The coefficient on Options is positive and significant and covariance between the two error terms ω is negative and significant. Both parameters are similar to those produced by Model 1 (as reported in Table   2 ). Similarly, I address the possible critique of leverage by excluding it from the list of instruments and including it as a control in both equations. The results, reported in Column (4) of Table 7 IV model (1)- (2). Control variables also include constant, ln(total assets), interest coverage, tax loss carry-forward dummy, zero dividends dummy, last year stock return, restricted stock grants, new and departing CEO indicators, and controls for time and industry. Standard deviation of the posterior is in parentheses.
It is useful to note that the variables that capture agency problems may also be correlated with the efficiency of CEO compensation. If governance index is not sufficient to control for compensation efficiency, then using agency-related variables as instruments would produce biased estimates. This critique, however, relies on the assumption that CEO compensation is inefficient in some firms, which is in line with the estimation results.
During the last decade, FASB has been arguing that the current accounting standard that does not require companies to expense employee option grants is misleading shareholders. 6 To analyze whether the change in the accounting of options has an effect on the size of option grants, I estimate a Tobit model of option grants, evaluated with Black-Scholes method, (Options) using one of the following three indicator variables: (1) an indicator for the observations on firms during and after the year of announcement (announcement), (2) an indicator for the observations on firms during and after the year of adoption (adoption), and (3) an indicator for all observations on firms that made the announcement (treatment group). I also control for other firm and CEO characteristics that may influence the decision to grant options. The estimation results are reported in Table 9 .
Neither announcement nor adoption have a significant effect on the size of option grants. More-over, the coefficient on announcement is positive, indicating that firms may even increase their option grants following the announcement. The negative coefficient on treatment group, which is significant at 6% level, implies that the firms in the treatment group awarded less option grants on average during years 1992-2002. Controls are constant, restricted stock grants, zero dividends dummy, tax loss carry-forward dummy, interest coverage, ln(total assets), governance index, relative noise in ROE Since the treatment group consists only of the firms that made the announcement voluntarily, the lack of evidence on the relevance of accounting for compensation policies may be driven by the fact that the treatment sample represents only those firms for which the change in accounting is not very important. 7 The possibility of a selection bias, therefore, implies that I may not observe a significant effect of the the change in accounting on compensation structure. A similar model is analyzed in BM, which I refer to as Model BM. The above hypothesis implies that the coefficient on governance index*Options should be insignificant for the firms that made the announcement. Table 11 reports the estimation results for the total sample in column (1), for the subsample of firms that made the announcement in column (2) and for the subsample that did not make the announcement in column (3) . Similarly to BM, I obtain a positive and significant coefficient on the product of option grants and governance index when I use the total sample of firms. This coefficient shows that firms with better governance charge more for option grants. Consistent with the selection bias hypothesis, I find this coefficient to be insignificant for the subsample of firms that made the announcement. The stock market reactions to the announcements concerning accounting for stock options is studied in a number of papers (see, for example, Fayez, Pukthuanthong, and Roll (2005); they also offer a nice review of the related literature). Most of the studies find that the market tends to have a positive reaction to the news of more explicit accounting for option grants. Fayez, Pukthuanthong, and Roll (2005) also find that the stock market reaction is positively related to proxies for potential agency costs. These findings are consistent with selection bias hypothesis whereby firms with better compensation practices choose to signal their quality using accounting for option grants.
To summarize, I find no significant indication that improving accounting standards affects executive compensation practices. These findings indicate that inefficiencies affecting option grants may not be very different from those affecting other forms of compensation.
VII Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that many large public US corporations follow inefficient practices with respect to CEO compensation. In particular, on average, CEOs are charged neither for option grants nor for restricted stock grants. Moreover, in firms that tend to grant more stock-based compensation, CEOs are also able to negotiate higher salaries. While governance quality significantly affects CEO compensation, there is little evidence that it affects the charge for stock-based pay.
A significant amount of attention to the rules governing the CEO compensation has been paid by The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). One of the main topics of their recent debates concerning CEO compensation has been the effects of the current accounting standards, which do not require options to be expensed against income, on the use of option grants in compensation.
The analysis of a small sample of firms that voluntarily adopted an accounting method, which recognizes options as an expense, does not show any relationship between the accounting and the use of option grants in CEO compensation. ). Therefore, during the MCMC step, sample only x * it , and only for t such that x it = 0 from the above normal distribution, conditioned on z i(−t) , which is the vector obtained from z i by removing x * it , i.e. The next step is to sample coefficients β in the same block. The posterior distribution of β can be written as follows: 
The last group of parameters sampled in this block is {c i }. Applying Bayes formula, I find the conditional posterior distribution for c i to be
